ARE MANDATED HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMITTEES SUBSTITUTES FOR OR SUPPLEMENTS TO LABOR UNIONS?
DAVID WEIL* A subject of recurring debate in both academia and the business world is whether workplace committees and other forms of employee participation are substitutes for or supplements to labor unions. One well-established effect of unionization is increased enforcement of government labor policies such as OSHA; this study investigates the enforcement effects of mandated safety and health committees. A comparison of OSHA inspection records for the two years preceding and following the implementation of committee mandates in Oregon in 1991 shows that mandated committees significantly increased the differences between union and nonunion workplaces in OSHA enforcement, with enforcement strengthening considerably in union workplaces but edging upward only slightly in nonunion workplaces. The committees thus appear to have acted more as supplements to than substitutes for labor unions.
Should the shop committee be a substitute for the union, and thus make the plant or concern the final unit of organization on the part of the men, or should it be a supplement to the union and perform certain functions while retaining the wider organizations? Paul Douglas, "Shop Committees: Substitute for, or Supplements to Trade Unions?" (1921) [Works] councils appear capable of making an efficiency contribution to the performance of advanced industrial democracies improving both individual firm productivity and the effectiveness of state regulation (economic or social) of firms.
Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, Works Councils (1995) T he use of works councils, labor/management committees, and other forms of worker participation as a means to improve employment outcomes has been a subject of recurring debate for much of this In an earlier study (Weil 1996) , I re- In an analysis of the economics of works councils, Freeman and Lazear (1995) showed that mandating such forms of participation may be optimal from a social welfare perspective. In their model, the collaboration engendered by works councils increases the total economic rents created by a firm. Since such councils will also affect the distribution of rents-assuming One avenue for improved enforcement created under many labor statutes is to provide workers with rights to help achieve policy goals (Edwards 1993 Hoyman and Stallworth [1981] and Shavell [1984] in regard to the propensity to file civil litigation; Peterson [1992] in regard to the likelihood of pursing grievances in union workplaces; and Feuille and Delaney [1992] and Chachere and Feuille [1993] The decision facing a worker on whether or not to exercise a right is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1 . The horizontal axis, X, represents the difference be- 
Empirical Results
The major enforcement variables under study are summarized in the upper portion of Table 1 , which provides overall mean levels of the enforcement variables, hours devoted to inspections, violations detected during inspections, and penalty levels. The final column presents the difference in union/nonunion differences between the two periods. These results are discussed in detail below.
Complaint Inspections
The most direct measure of the impact (Table 1 ). This change arose primarily from an increase in the incidence of complaint inspections in the nonunion sector, which rose from 11% to almost 15% (see row 1 of Table 2 ). Because the overall incidence of complaint inspections remained constant across the two periods of time in the union sector, the union/nonunion gap in complaint inspection incidence narrowed following passage of the committee mandate (see the final column in the row 1 of 14The values of the coefficients in Table 3 In 1988-89, a complaint inspection was .085 more likely in a union workplace than in a nonunion workplace. Based on the estimates presented in Table 5 , the imposition of a committee mandate led to about a 13% reduction in the union/ nonunion difference in the likelihood of a complaint inspection. Committees are therefore associated with an increase in nonunion workers' exercise of their com- Walkaround rights. The overall incidence of employee participation in inspections via the "walkaround" right rose from 23.2% prior to committee mandates to nearly 30% following passage of the mandates (Table 1) . Row 2 of Table 2 shows that the incidence of walkaround aBased on regression results in Table 4. bUnrestricted union gap estimates based on separate regression estimates for 1988-89 and 1992-93 periods for each enforcement outcome. The change in the union gap is calculated as the difference between the estimated union/nonunion coefficient in each period (see text). Full regression results are available from the author.
CEstimated change in the probability of outcome between the two periods; all other parameters evaluated at their means.
periods (final column of row 2, Table   2 ).16 Table 3 reports logit estimates of the probability that employees exercise their right to a walkaround inspection for the pooled sample, controlling for the complete set of factors listed in (2) and including a pre/post mandate dummy and an interaction term to capture D PRE -D POST U '6Union workplaces experienced increases in overall rates of walkarounds from about 48% to 55.5%. This increase was most dramatic among smallerestablishments (those with 1-99 and 100-249 employees).
In fact, the incidence of walkarounds actually fell among the union establishments with more than 500 employees. On the other hand, nonunion use of walkarounds increased at statistically significant levels for all size groups. However, the largest increases Column (1) of Table 4 What Is Driving the Growing Differentials?
The growth in union/nonunion differentials found in all areas of enforcement except for complaint inspection incidence suggests that the "mandated committees as supplements" effect outweighs the "mandated committees as substitutes" effect.
However, the magnitude of these separate effects remains of interest: even if committees on average widen the enforcement gap, it might still be the case that they result in important changes in nonunion workplaces. The lower portion of 
Conclusion
The data show that in Oregon the overall effect of a health and safety committee mandate was to widen differences between union and nonunion levels of OSHA enforcement in the workplace. This suggests that mandated safety and health committees' "supplement to unions" effect dominates their "substitutes for unions" effect.
Across a variety of enforcement measures, the only case in which the committee mandate led to a decrease in the union/nonunion gap was the probability that a complaint inspection was filed, and that effect was very small, and not statistically significant at conventional levels. Ongoing experience with mandated committees in Oregon and other states will therefore be important in measuring the long-term consequences of mandates.
The lessons from the Oregon experience to date, however, echo the conclusion drawn by Paul Douglas in 1921. At the close of his article, "Shop Committees," Douglas wrote:
Modern industry needs both the shop committee and the trades union, since both are necessary for the effective carrying out of the relationship between workmen and employer....
The relationship of the two bodies, in other words, is properly complementary, and not mutually exclusive. We can only hope that in
In nonunion environments, mandated workplace committees may partially satisfy the need for workplace public goods. However, in these settings mandated committees do not provide a full solution to the problem of workplace public policy provision. Apparently, a combination of workplace institutions is necessary to fully address public policy concerns.
APPENDIX
The Oaxaca procedure can be applied to the estimation of mandated committees on union/nonunion enforcement differentials as follows. Assume that pre-and post-mandate enforcement can be modeled The first term in equation (A6) provides the direct estimate of the change in enforcement attributable to the shift in the union coefficients-that is, the relative increase, decrease, or lack of change in the union/ nonunion gap in enforcement, and similar changes for other enforcement determinants. The second term represents the portion of enforcement change arising from shifts in the levels of variables between the two periods (including the density of unionization).
